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THE IMPACT OF THE
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
ON COURT STRUCTURE

Ralph P. Dupont*

Court reform has always moved slowly and seemingly against

both the legislative and judicial grain.' It is presently the case that
the majority of American states has not yet begun to consider the
structural inhibitions on fiduciary efficiency which are inherent in
the antiquated systems of probate courts found in these states. 2 In
* Member of the Connecticut Bar. A.B., 195 1, Brown University; J.D., 1956, Harvard
University.
I Consolidation of the probate courts with courts of general jurisdiction has been
advocated by many of the nation's outstanding legal scholars for over twenty-five years,
without major success. See, e.g., R. POUND, ORGANIZATION OF THE COURTS (1940); L.
SIMES & P. BASYE, PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAW: MODEL PROBATE CODE (1946); Pound,
Principles and Outline of a Modern Unified Court Organization, 23 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y.
225 (1940). The parallel experience in the United Kingdom terminated over 100 years ago
in unification of all courts (including probate) as divisions of the High Court of Justice. See
Simes & Basye, The Organization of the Probate Court in America: Il, 43 MICH. L. REV.
113, 113- 17 (1944). Advocates of probate court reorganization should note that reform in
the United Kingdom apparently took more than twenty-five years to achieve, as measured
from the date of publication of the first major study of court organization. Associations of
inferior court judges have discouraged court reorganization, and even the grant of broad
rulemaking power over the probate courts has not resulted in prompt exercise of that
power. For example, in Florida effectuation of revisions of the rules of probate required a
period from November 6, 1956, to January 1, 1968. See generally Clark, Rales of Probate
and- Guardianship Effective Jan. 1, 41 FLA. B.J. 1158 (1967). But cf. Whitman, The
Concept of A Probate Court Administrator, I ll TRUSTS & ESTATES 12 (1972). See also
Healey, The Connecticut Probate Courts: Simple, Direct, Efficient, Practical, 32 CONN.
B.J. 249 (1958). See also MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 701.53 (1968), providing for an
annual convention of probate judges. If such organizations of judges are engaged in
attempts to influence legislation a question exists as to whether a person holding judicial
office may maintain membership in such an organization under the revised Code of Judicial
Ethics.
See ABA CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Nos. 3, 4, 5, 7 (Tent. Draft 1971).
2
See, e.g., Alabama (ALA. CONST. art. 6, § 149; ALA. CODE tit. 13. § 278 (1959));
Arkansas (ARK. STAT. ANN. § 62-2004 (1971)); Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. REV.
§§ 45-I to -4 (1960), as amended, (Supp. 1972) ); Delaware (DEL. CONST. art. 4, §§ 2, 36,
37; ch. 402, §§ 3-5, [19691 DEL. LAWS 1165-66, enacted under authority of DEL. CONST.
art. 4, § 36, vests probate jurisdiction in the court of chancery. Although no reference to
probate courts is made, this separation of law and equity is continued in the proposed
constitution, to be effective July 1, 1973, art. 4, §§ 4.01-.07.) ); Georgia (GA. CONST.
§ 2-4101); Indiana (IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 29-2-I-I (1972), §§ 4-5 101, 4-5201, 4-5301, 4-531
to -533 (1968)); Kansas (KAN. CONST. art. 3, § 8); Kentucky (KY. REV. STAT. §§ 25.110,
23.030(2) (1971)); Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, §§ 251, 401 (1964)); Michigan
(MICH. CONST. art. 6, §§ 15, 19; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 701.19 (1968), § 701.45a-d
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fact the probate courts of some jurisdictions have remained vir3
tually unchanged since the American Revolution.
In contrast to the majority, a smaller number of states has in
recent years overhauled and streamlined their probate courts.
Approximately twenty states 4 have placed probate jurisdiction in
their trial courts of general jurisdiction. It can be argued that
consolidation of probate jurisdiction with general trial court jurisdiction is more efficient and more in accord with the needs of
(Supp. 1972));

Minnesota (MINN. CONST. art. 6, §6; MINN.

STAT. ANN.

§525.71

(1969)); Mississippi (MIss. CODE ANN. § 9-5-83 (1972)); Missouri (Mo. CONST. art. 5,
§ 16; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 472.020 (1956), §§ 472.010(6), 472.200, 472.250 (1956), as
amended, (Supp. 1973)); Nebraska (NEB. CONST. art. V, §§ 15, 17; NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 24-503, 24-504, 24-541 (1964)); New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 547:1 to
:3, 547:30 (1955), §§ 491:7, 498:1 (1968), as amended, (Supp. 1972); §§ 490-A:1 to :3
(Supp. 1972)); New Jersey (N.J. CONST. art. 6, § 5; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 3A:2-1 to 2-5
(county court), 3A:3-17 (surrogate's court), 3A:6-3 (superior court) (1953)); New Mexico
(N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-4-1, 16-4-10, 16-4-18 (1953), § 30-2-24 (1953), as amended,
(Supp. 1972)); North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-07-02 (1960)); Rhode Island (R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 8-9-3 to -4, 33-23-1 (1968), §§ 8-9-2.2 to -2.3 (Supp. 1971) ); South
Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-401, 15-444, 7-201 (1962)); South Dakota (S.D. CONST.
art. V, §§ 19, 20; S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 16-9-11, 16-9-16 (1967), §§ 16-9-13,
30-35-1 (Supp. 1972)); Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 16-601, 16-609, 16-610, 16-615,
16-701, 16-709, 16-711, 16-717, 16-719, 18-604 to -606, 18-608, 27-401 to -408 (1955),
§ 16-330 (Supp. 1972), § 1-205(7) (1971). The last section cited continued those special
courts existing prior to the enactment of the Tennessee Code, and these are the Probate
Courts of Shelby and Davidson Counties and the Law and Equity Courts of Dyer and
Blount Counties.); Texas (TEX. CONST. art. V. §§ 8, 16; TEX. PROB. CODE §§ 3(e)-(g), 4, 5
(1956)); Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, §§ 271, 273-277, 311 (1972), tit. 4, § 219 (Supp.
1972), tit. 12, § 2553 (1958), § 2555 (1958), as amended, (Supp. 1972), § 2386 (a) (Supp.
1972)); Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. §§ 64.1-75 (1968), as amended, (Supp. 1972),
§§ 17-117 to -119.1 (1960), as amended, (Supp. 1972), § 17-123 (1960) (circuit courts);
§§ 17-136, 17-137 (1960), § 17-135, 17-139 (1960), as amended, (Supp. 1972) (corporation or hustings courts); and probate jurisdiction is otherwise in the city-based courts, as
follows: (1) Richmond, §§ 17-153.1, 17-154 (1960), as amended, (Supp. 1972), § 17-161
(1960); (2) Norfolk, § 17-186 (1960) (concurrent among law and chancery, circuit and
corporation courts); (3) Roanoke, § 17-210 (1960) (concurrent as among the three city
courts); and (4) Hampton, §§ 17-221.18, 17-221.19 (Supp. 1972) (concurrent among two
city courts)); West Virginia (W. VA. CONST. art. 8, §§ 22-24; W. VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 7-1-1 to 7-1-9 (1969), as amended, (Supp. 1970), § 7-1-3 (1969), § 58-3-1 (1966)).
3 See generally Simes & Basye, The Organization of the Probate Court in America: 1,
424MIcH. L. REV. 965 (1944).
See, e.g., Alaska (ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.06.050(5), 13.06.065 (1972)); Arizona (ARIZ.
CONST. art. 6, § 14); California (CAL. CONST. art. 6, § 5; CAL. PROB. CODE § 301 (West
1956) ); Colorado (CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-13-5(2) (Supp. 1965)); Florida (FLA.
CONST. art. 5, § 7); Hawaii (HAWAII REV. STAT. § 603-22(13) (1968)); Idaho (IDAHO
CODE ANN. §§ 15-1-201(6), 15-1-301 (Supp. 1972) ); Illinois (ILL. CONST. art. 6, § 9; ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 2 (196 1), as amended, (Supp. 1972)); Iowa (IowA CODE ANN.
§ 633.10 (1964)); Louisiana (LA. CONST. art. 7, §§ 35, 81); Montana (MONT. CONST. art.
VIII, § 1I; MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-318 (1949)); Nevada (NEV. CONST. art. 6, § 6;
NEV. REV. STAT. § 3.210 (1971)); North Carolina (N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 12(3); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-3 to -4 (1969), § 7A-40 (1969), as amended, (Supp. 1971)); Ohio (Ohio
Const. art. IV, §4c; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2101.45 (1968)); Oregon (Ore. Rev. Stat.
§§ 1I1.005- 111.185 (1972)); Oklahoma (OKLA. CONST. art. 7, § 7); Pennsylvania (PA.
CONST. art. 5, §§4-5; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, 9H 2080.012(2), 2080.201 to .203, 2080.301
(1964), as amended, (Supp. 1972)); Utah (UTAH CONST. art. XXIV, § 9; UTAH CODE
ANN. § 75-1-6 (1953)); Washington (WASH. CONST. art. 4, § 6; WASH. REV. CODE ANN.

§ 2.08.010 (1957)); Wyoming (Wyo. CONST. art. 5, § 10; WYo. STAT. ANN. § 2-3 (1957)).
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persons interested in probate proceedings. Several states have
also recently taken other steps to modernize their probate sys5
tems.
Although the move toward court reform in general has accelerated of its own accord in the past several years, an impetus to
probate court reform has been generated by the Uniform Probate
Code (UPC or Code). 6 The Code is primarily concerned with
matters of substantive law, but it also makes important procedural

reforms. Section 1-201(5) of the Code suggests that jurisdiction
over trusts, estates, guardianships and probate matters should be
vested in a single court. Although the Code contemplates vesting

jurisdiction over probate matters in a single court, it does not
require the adoption of any particular court system. Thus, on
adoption of the Code, the states will largely be free to restructure
their courts as they see fit. Idaho, for example, has vested its

5 For example, idaho (IDAHO CODE ANN. tit. 15 (Supp. 1972) ); Maryland (MD. ANN.
CODE art. 93 (1969), as amended, (Supp. 1972)); New York (N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC.
(1967)); and, most recently, Alaska (ALASKA STAT. tit. 13 (1972)) have substantially

revised their substantive law of probate. See also Hildreth, The New SCPA -Aspects of
Practice Relating to Jurisdiction, Proceedings,Appearances, and Protection of Persons
Under Disability, 34 BROOKLYN L. REV. 359, 361-65 (1968). Florida has finally adopted
revised rules for probate practice, and has integrated the probate function of the county
court, formerly involving about sixty judges, with its circuit court and has created a probate division of that court. See FLA. CONST. art. 5, § 37. See also Clark, supra note 1. In
Connecticut the probate court administrator recently completed a revision of the probate
rules which may be of great significance because the administration of "noncontentious
business" may be made easier. The new rules may be a step toward reversing the old line
about "a court that is not required to know any law and does not know any more than the
law requires." Caron v. Old Reliable Gold Mining Co., 12 N.M. 211, 226, 78 P. 63, 67
(1904). Connecticut is still struggling with needed structural reforms and a general upgrading of the qualifications of probate judges because the need for reform is only dimly
perceived by the legislature Cf. Brennan, Probate Reform, 42 CONN. B.J. I (1968);
Dupont, The Impact of the Uniform Probate Code on Connecticut Court Structure, 2
CONN. L. REV. 563, 563-64 & nn. 4-6 (1970).
6 All citations are to the official text of the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) unless a
statute of a particular state is involved. In that case the statute will be cited without
reference to the parallel provisions of the Uniform Probate Code, unless the statute differs
from the Code.
While the Code does not require restructuring of vested centers of judicial power, it
certainly encourages an examination of all aspects of probate court administration. See
Wellman, The New Uniform Probate Code, 56 A.B.A.J. 636, 639-40 (1970). As a result,
serious scholarly effort is beginning to be expended on the present role of the probate
judge, and, as proposed under the Code, with concomitant emphasis on the extent of court
reorganization required by the Code. See, e.g., McKleroy, The Uniform Probate Code: A
Comparison with Existing Alabama Probate Law, 2 CUM.-SAM. L. REV. 1, 3-5 (1972);
Rollison, Commentary on the Uniform ProbateCode, 29 ALA. LAW. 427, 428 (1968); and
Comment, The Office of the Probate Judge in Alabama: His Duties, Qualifications and
Problems, 22 ALA. L. REV. 157 (1969). Indeed, one commentator, reporting for an Illinois
lawyers' study group, has gone so far as to suggest that the structural and procedural
reforms offered by the Code are its best feature and should be enacted independently of
substantive law portions of the Code. See Zartman. An Illinois Critique of the Uniform
Probate Code, 1970 U. ILL. L.F. 413, 414-415, 535.
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district courts (the general trial courts) with jurisdiction over all
7
matters covered by the Code.
As will be discussed later in this article, it is the author's
contention that vesting probate jurisdiction in the general trial
courts will be optimal in terms of court consolidation and
effectuation of the aims of the Code. In those jurisdictions which
have already unified their probate courts, the extent of court
reorganization required as a consequence of enactment of the
Code would be minimal. Minor structural changes would be required in several other states if the Code were adopted.8 For
those states which have not restructured their systems, 9 however,
a decision to adopt the UPC would also involve a consideration of
significant structural changes in their court systems. The purpose
of this article is to examine the extent of structural change which
will be necessitated by adoption of the Code and to identify the
factors involved in making a choice among the alternatives reasonably available.
After considering the present pattern of probate court structure
in the United States, this article considers the need for probate
court reform as reflected in the deficiencies of the present system.
It further indicates that a realistic choice of court structure by
legislatures will ultimately be made from among three options: (1)
to enlarge the jurisdiction of the present probate court of the
state10 more nearly to approximate the form currently obtaining in
7
See IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 15-1-201(6), 15-1-301 (Supp. 1972). See also Peterson,
Idaho's Uniform Probate Code: A Bird's Eye View, 8 IDAHO L. REV. 289 (1972).
8
This would be the case in Colorado, Ohio and Oregon. Colorado has a separate
probate court for the City and County of Denver. (CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 37-13-5(2)
(Supp. 1965) ). The district court, the state's second tier trial court, otherwise possesses
jurisdiction over Code matters. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-13-5(2) (Supp. 1965).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2101.46 (1968) would have to be repealed, because it encourages the expansion of inferior probate courts as a matter of elective option subject to a
local population requirement. Cf. MICH. CONST. art. 6, § 15, which permits voter-approved
consolidation of county courts into probate districts. See also MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. §§ 701.2a, .2b (Supp. 1972).
Oregon assigns probate jurisdiction among the circuit court (general trial court), the
district court (second tier trial court), the juvenile court, and the county court. Only six
county courts exercise probate powers, but even this slight variation would seem to run
counter to the Code's requirement of a single court, although the result, in fact, may be
reasonable and wholly consistent with goals of the Code, for the legislature apparently has
found this allocation of judicial personnel most efficient in view of the business transacted
in these counties. Compare UPC §§ 1-201(5) and 1-302(b), with ORE. REV. STAT.
§§ 1.055-111.185 (1969).
9 See note 2 supra.
1
°Those states having large numbers of part-time probate judges and with a limited
number of lawyers serving as judges, (see notes 45-52 and 56-59 and accompanying text
infra) will probably be unwilling to permit the judicial power conferred by the Code to be
exercised by such judges. Therefore, this alternative is probably not a realistic one in those
jurisdictions. But see MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 701.45d (Supp. 1972) abolishing trials
de novo and providing for jury trials in the probate courts, in which the judges must be
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several states; 11 (2) to appoint a new body of probate judges and
thus create an entirely new court; 12 and (3) to enlarge the jurisdiction of the present general trial court to include all matters cognizable under the Code.' 3 In choosing among these alternatives care

must be taken to understand the nature of the probate situation in
each state so that a practical solution will take into account
reasonable objections to systemic reforms by interested parties
such as current officeholders.
I.

THE EXISTING PROBATE COURT

SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES

A. Patternsof Probate Court Structure
Although probate court structures are not susceptible to easy
classification, several basic patterns can be delineated in the
United States today.' 4 A significant number of states has vested
jurisdiction over all probate matters in general trial courts. Others
have left original jurisdiction in inferior probate courts with a trial
de novo in a higher court serving as an appeal. A few states have
placed many aspects of their probate jurisdiction in a separate tier
of courts. Still others have adopted a specific mechanism for
allocating jurisdiction among the various courts.
In the approximately twenty states which have vested their
general trial courts with probate jurisdiction,' 5 probate matters
lawyers, even though some are not serving full time. On the other hand, Massachusetts, for
example, might confer the power to conduct jury trials on its probate court because the
Commonwealth already has eleven full-time skilled jurists.
11MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 215, §§ 3, 6 (Supp. 1971); N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 12;
N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. §§ 201, 209 (1967). The surrogate's court would require added
powers to deal with inter vivos trusts, jurisdiction over which is now exclusively vested in
the supreme court. See Siegel, Practice Commentary, N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. 42, 46-47
(1967). See also Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 851.25, 879.27 (1971), § 253.10 (1971), as amended,
(Supp.
1972); MD. ANN. CODE art. 93, § 2-102 (1969).
2
1 The trend is certainly not in this direction as witnessed by the fact that only four such
court systems are extant. See note I I and accompanying text supra. Arguably Michigan
also falls in this category. See note 10 supra.
Legislation to create a two-tiered system of probate courts was introduced in Connecticut in 1969: an upper level of full-time probate judges elected as required by Article
5, Section 4 of the Connecticut Constitution, and a lower level of registrars of probate
exercising the nonjudicial functions contemplated by the Code. See Dupont, supra note 5,
at 573-74. Doubtlessly the considerable political problems involved in tampering with the
positions of 125 Connecticut probate judges played a decisive role in the legislative
process from drafting to the final defeat of the bill.
13 This route has already been followed in about twenty states. See note 4 supra.
4
1 See generally L. SIMES & P. BASYE, PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAW: MODEL PROBATE
CODE 385-488 (1946); Comment, supra note 6; Wellman, The Uniform Probate Code:
Blueprint For Reform in the 70's, 2 CONN. L. REv. 453, 460 n.32 (1970).
15 See note 4 supra.
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are, of course, but one of a wide range of issues dealt with by
these courts. These states have apparently avoided the expenditure of time and money involved in an initial probate court
hearing followed by a duplicative and wasteful trial de novo. In
addition, lodging probate jurisdiction in the general trial court
affords the litigation the attention of a skilled jurist from the
outset, rather than only after a complete presentation in a lower
court.
In those states with the trial de novo, the system of inferior
courts is overlain by an appellate system in which the general trial
court sits as a court of probate 16 which conducts appeals in the
form of full trials. 17 In the appeal-trial a record is made for the
first time,' and a jury trial may or may not be had, as may be
appropriate. 19 These appeals may finally require determination by
the highest appellate court of the state in the usual form for
20
appeals from trial courts.
16 Those states employing the trial de novo are among those listed in note 2 supra.
Occasionally, direct appeal to the state's highest appellate court is provided for if the
appeal is limited to a question of law. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2551 (1958),
§§ 2555, 2386(a) (Supp. 1972). In other states, failure to frame the appeal properly may
limit the scope of the trial de novo. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 30-26-08 (1962). In still
others, the court may limit the scope of the de novo proceedings in its discretion. The state
of Michigan (MIcH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 701.45a(2) (Supp. 1972)) simply prohibits de
novo trials, although it is at least questionable whether Michigan can always afford the
probate litigant an initial hearing of the quality obtainable in the four states whose probate
courts are completely on a par with their general trial courts. See also Nelson, The
Uniform Probate Code: A Model for Probate Reform in South Dakota, 16 S.D.L. REV.
382, 392-93 (1970).
17 The close relationship between equity and probate may well be somewhat responsible
for the widespread use of the trial de novo, for equity appeals usually were only renewed
attempts to secure the relief originally requested and denied. Indeed, the trial de novo has
found present-day justification among some who support the probate status quo. They
claim it is a device for reducing the amount of litigation which would otherwise occupy the
time of the general trial courts. Although there is no known supporting data of any sort, it
is said that the number of cases tried in the probate court is a greater number of cases than
actually reaches the general trial court for trial de novo, thus achieving a reduction in the
number of matters that would otherwise require attention by the general trial court.
Nevertheless this would not seem to be any greater reduction in the caseload than would
probably have been achieved in any event as a result of amicable dispositions. Of course,
the expense and delay in the attendant decisional process of two full trials in many cases
would seem far to outweigh whatever benefit the trial courts might secure from the
disposition of some cases in another forum.
18 Questions have arisen as to whether all courts of probate are courts of record within
the meaning of Article IV, Section 1 of the United States Constitutior. See Hopkins,
ExtraterritorialEffect of ProbateDecrees, 53 YALE L.J. 221, 229-36 (1944).
' 9 Jury trials are constitutionally required in many matters which might involve
fiduciaries: wrongful death actions, claims arising on a contract entered into by the
decedent prior to death; debts of the decedent; and many other matters involving factual
issues determined by juries at common law. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII. See also C.
WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 92, at 402-09 (1970).
20 There are differences among the states in this regard. In Vermont, for example, there
are eighteen probate districts having original jurisdiction, with appeals directly to the
supreme court on questions of law and otherwise to the county courts, where a trial de
novo is had. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2551 (1958), §§ 2555, 2386(a) (Supp. 1972). In
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Four states have developed probate courts which are independent of, and equal in stature to, the general trial courts.
These courts have virtually full jurisdiction over probate matters,
with direct appeal to the state appellate courts. 2 1 Similar to this
situation is the continuance of the wholly separate law and chancery courts, with the latter exercising probate jurisdiction. Three
states,2 2 and arguably a fourth2 3 have these bifurcated systems.
A distribution of probate jurisdiction among several levels of
courts is found in Indiana, Virginia, and Oregon. Indiana presents
the situation in which the legislature has individually authorized
several specific courts of probate, while generally granting concurrent jurisdiction of probate matters to the superior court and
the circuit court.2 4 Virginia has reacted in a similar fashion, and
its probate jurisdiction is widely dispersed.2 5 In a fashion somewhat different from Virginia, the Oregon legislature parcels out
probate jurisdiction among the various inferior courts.2 6 Significantly, the legislature has, with few exceptions, assigned probate jurisdiction to the circuit court, the general trial court of that
27
state.
Texas the district court, as a Court of general jurisdiction, has cognizance of appeals from
the decisions of the county courts and a trial de novo is required. TEX. PROB. CODE § 5
(1956). The district court, however, also has original jurisdiction of some probate matters,
unlike the Connecticut Superior Court, for example, jurisdiction of which is confined to
appeals from probate. Compare TEX. PROB. CODE § 5 (1956), with CONN. GEN. STAT.
REV. § 45-288 (1958).
21These states are Massachusetts, Maryland, New York and Wisconsin, although
Michigan
and South Dakota perhaps could be included. See note I I supra.
22
See ARK. CONST. amend. 24; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 62-2004 (197 1). There may,
however, be some Arkansas probate courts which have not been consolidated with
chancery. Furthermore, the chancellor apparently can appoint a referee in probate as
needed. See also MISS. CODE ANN. § 9-5-83 (1972); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:6-3 (1953).
The county court in New Jersey has a probate division which apparently has countywide
jurisdiction over probate matters. Nevertheless, the chancery division of the superior court
obviously has the necessary equitable power to entertain many matters involving descedents' estates. An example would be a case involving an escheat. Id. § 2A:37-14 (1953).
The surrogate is, however, the clerk of the county court, and apparently functions as a
registrar of probate. Id. § 3A:3-17.
23 DEL. CONST. art. 4, §§ 2, 36.
24
Jurisdiction over probate matters is generally vested in the circuit court. IND. ANN.
STAT. §§ 29-2-1-1, 33-4-4-3 (1972). The legislature has, however, seen fit to create two
county probate courts. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 4-5l0 I to 4-5123, 4-5301 to 4-5325 (1968), as
amended, (Supp. 1972). In a number of instances, probate jurisdiction is granted concurrently in varying degrees to county superior courts. See IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 4-40 I to
4-3217 (1968), as amended, (Supp. 1971). This court organization does not seem to be
compatible with the Code.
2 See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 64.-1.74 (1968), §§ 17-117 to -119 (1960), as amended,
(Supp. 1972), § 17-123 (1960) (circuit courts), §§ 17-135 to -139 (1960), as amended,
(Supp. 1972) (corporation courts); probate jurisdiction is otherwise in the city-based
courts, as follows: (1) Richmond, §§ 17-154, 17-161 (1960); (2) Norfolk, § 17-186 (1960)
(concurrent among law and chancery, circuit and corporation courts); (3) Roanoke,
§ 17-210 (1960) (concurrent as among the three city courts); and (4) Hampton,
§ 17-221.19 (Supp. 1972) (concurrent among two city courts).
26 ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 111.055-.185 (1972).
27 In Oregon jurisdiction of probate matters is vested in county courts in six counties.
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B. The Need for Court Consolidation
1. PracticalDifficulties in Reform- In order to achieve a more
uniform and appropriate system for the application of probate law,
jurisdictional reform of the probate court appears necessary. This
reform will not, of course, be without difficulty. In some states
probate courts organized in a designated manner are required by
the state constitution. In Alabama, for example, the abolition or
consolidation of probate courts is constitutionally forbidden. 28
These provisions create the contradictory situation of enlightened
theories of justice 2 9 existing side-by-side with constitutional provisions which in effect permit great numbers of persons untrained in
the law to serve as part-time probate judges. 30 Another difficulty
can be seen in that although probate courts are more in need of
reform than many other courts, they are the courts most solidly
rooted in the legal and social establishment, and thus are the ones
least susceptible to reorganization. 31 An attempt at reform of the
Connecticut probate courts in 1969, for example, was rebuffed in
a summary manner. 3 2 It is now clear that something more than a
best-selling book urging the complete avoidance of probate 33 is
needed if substantial probate reform is to be accomplished in this

The state's second-tier trial court, known as the circuit court, exercises probate jurisdiction in nine counties. It would seem that this division of probate jurisdiction may violate
the single court concept of the UPC, and yet is really serving the purposes of the Code by
promoting judicial efficiency in light of Oregon's needs. Doubtlessly, the Code draftsmen
would have no strenuous objection to a broader definition of the word "court" in
§ 1-201(5) in states wishing to adopt the Oregon approach. If there were no constitutional
difficulties involved, the legislature might wish to invest the state's highest tribunal with
authority to allocate jurisdiction among inferior courts and between those courts and the
state's
trial court or courts.
28
ALA. CONST.art. VI, § 171.
29 It seems remarkable that a state could have adopted the "second look" doctrine
almost twenty years ago to ameliorate the draconian affects of the rule against perpetuities
and yet continue an outmoded probate court system. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REV.
§§ 45-95, -96 (1958), as amended, Conn. P.A. 127, § 68, [1972] Public & Special Acts
129, 167.
30
See CONN. CONST. art. V, § 4; CONN. GEN. SrAT. REV. §§ 45-1, 45- a (1958), as
amended, (Supp. 1972), § 45-1(b) (Supp. 1972).
31 See, e.g., Whitman, Report to the Probate Administrator on the State of the Probate
Courts in Connecticut, 2 CONN. L. REV. 579 (1970).
32
Indeed, soon after the bill was brought to the Judiciary Committee [of the
Connecticut General Assembly] and lobbied against, the Committee failed to
report the bill out, the Commission [to Study and Report on a Revision of the
Probate Laws of the State of Connecticut] was summarily disbanded and the
work of the Reporters for the Commission, comparing the present Connecticut probate law to the Uniform Probate Code, was terminated.
Id. at 583.
33 N. DACEY, How To AVOID PROBATE (1965). See also Wellman, supra note 14, at
453 n.4; Rubinow, Symposium on Probate Law: Introduction, 2 CONN. L. REV. 449, 450
n.4 (1970); Whitman, supra note 31, at 583 n.7.
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century. 34 These considerations indicate that reform does not
occur in a vacuum. One who seeks to restructure probate courts
must cast at least an occasional backward glance at the political
implications of the conclusions reached.
2. Deficiencies in the Current System -Having acknowledged
the practical difficulties in reform, it is appropriate to enumerate
the deficiencies of current probate court structure. While it may
not be enough merely to recite the shortcomings and advantages
of the present system, this is certainly the first step in the analysis.
There are several basic systemic problems which emphasize the
need for reform. Present court systems suffer from limitations of
subject matter jurisdiction, diversity of structure, multiplicity of
forums, and complexity of jurisdictional definitions. A further
problem underlying the probate court structure of each state is the
demographic variations which generate radical differences in the
complexity of dockets between cities on the one hand and small
5
towns and rural settings on the otherP
The sporadic development of American courts has produced a
number of problems in the probate system. One result of this
development is that those probate courts which are not general
trial courts are courts of special or limited jurisdiction. These
jurisdictional limitations are, on the one hand, administratively
inefficient because they divide cases which might truly arise out of
the same facts, and, on the other hand, they are a great source of
confusion for litigants, lawyers, and interested parties. Although
they are intimately involved with the administration of the decedent's estate, these courts cannot, for example, try a wrongful
34 It has been reported that:
A substantial number of people now have a large stake in the present system
[Connecticut's probate courts] and do not look forward to any real change,
regardless of its merits. Accordingly, much of the discussion of probate court
reorganization and reform falls on deaf ears and simply generates an abundance of wheel spinning. This fact, coupled with the legislature's tendency to
react to pressures exerted upon it, means that politics, power struggles,
personal gain, and pride, as much as, or more than, concern for the public
good, will underlie positions taken on the probate courts. It is thus not
surprising that arguments for or against the probate courts are often polarized
and emotionally charged.
Whitman, supra note 31, at 58 1.
35 In Connecticut, for example, there are 125 separate probate courts, each individually
authorized by the legislature. There is no difference in jurisdiction among the courts except
by legislatively imposed territorial limits (usually co-extensive with town lines). For a full
discussion of Connecticut's probate courts, see Whitman, supra note 31. An even more
critical and detailed analysis of the Alabama probate judges has also been done. See
generally Comment, supra note 6. Regrettably, however, other states have by-passed the
opportunity to make a critical evaluation of their own systems or have remained pointedly
silent about court reorganization while otherwise making a rather detailed study of the
need for probate law revision. See, e.g., Chaffin, Improving Georgia's Probate Code, 4
GA. L. REV. 505 (1970): GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO REVIEW AND REVISE THE TESTAMENTARY LAW OF MARYLAND, SECOND REPORT (1968).
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death action. This is true even though the probate court may
ultimately be required to approve the fiduciary's decision to dispose of the claim, for example, by making an out-of-court settlement. The court would also be involved with the distribution of
36
the avails of the action.
Other limitations on subject matter jurisdiction come to mind
readily. There are various limitations on a given probate court as
to whether it can try title to the decedent's real estate,37 construe
his will or trust,3 8 determine damages in an action based on a
predeath contract,3 9 render a judgment for money damages consequent upon a disapproval of an accounting, 40 or exercise full
41
equitable powers.
In contrast to those states which curtail the powers of the
probate judge, other states have placed substantial nonprobate
responsibilities on probate judges. In Alabama, for example, the
range of duties given to the probate judge is enough to satiate
even the most ambitious politician's quest for power. 42 An Alabama probate judge is involved in almost every aspect of county
government, from the issuance of hunting licenses to the collec43
tion of beer taxes.
It is submitted that the patterns of these limitations and nonprobate responsibilities vary widely across the nation, and only after
the adoption of the structural changes and jurisdictional reforms
embodied in the Uniform Probate Code will a single state court in
each state possess the power and jurisdictional range required to
44
act efficiently in all matters regarding decedent's estates.
A further problem plaguing the current system is the great
number of probate courts within each state. The number of courts
also may not bear any relationship to the need for the services of
probate jurists. In Florida, for example, a state in which there is a
considerable volume of probate activity, these matters were managed until recently by sixty county courts. 45 In Georgia, county
organization is also employed, with the probate system of that
36

See, e.g.,CoNN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 45-280 (Supp. 1969).
Appeal of Wilson, 84 Conn. 560, 80 A. 718 (1911); Lockett v. Doyle, 148 Conn.
639, 173 A.2d 507 (1961).
38
See Union & New Haven Trust Co. v. Sherwood., 110 Conn. 150, 147 A. 562 (1929);
Dupont,
supra note 5, 566- 67 & nn. 18-26.
39
See I W. LOCKE & P. KOHN, CONNECTICUT PROBATE PRACTICE § 73, at 137 & n.7
37 See

(1951).
40

See Phillips v. Moeller, 147 Conn. 482, 163 A.2d 95 (1960).
I W. LOCKE & P. KOHN, supra note 39, §§ 96-102.

41 See
42

See generally Comment, supra note 6.

43Id. at 164-74.

44 UPC

§§ 1-201(5), 1-302, 3-105.

§ 7; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 36.01 (1961). A recent amendment to
FLA. CONST. art. 5, § 7, has remedied this multiplicity of courts.
45 FLA. CONST. art. 5,
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state consisting of approximately 140 courts of ordinary. 46 Connecticut 4 7 and Michigan48 follow Georgia among the leaders in the
50
49
number of probate courts. Some states, such as Connecticut,
Kansas 5 1 and Alabama, 52 have gone so far as to enshrine constitutionally their large number of probate courts.
This multiplicity of courts leads, in some states, to the associated problem of overlapping jurisdictions. Under several current
systems jurisdictional tangles of great magnitude are possible, and
the opportunity for confusion respecting which court has jurisdiction is not uncommon. In Texas, for example, the county courts
are given exclusive jurisdiction over probate matters, except in
those counties in which a probate court has been created by
statute, with an appeal to the district court (general trial
court).53 Tennessee not only has exceptions to its general rule that

jurisdiction is exercised by its county courts, 5 4 but trials de novo
on appeal are conducted in either the chancery court or the circuit
55 It
court, depending upon which county produces the appeal.
should be no surprise to recognize that in addition to those confusions concerning the proper forum, interested parties must also
contend with the limitations on the subject matter jurisdiction of
the appropriate forum.
The need for probate court reform is further highlighted by
some of the miscellaneous oddities inhering in current probate
court structures. For example, it is often the case that laymen
serve as judges in probate courts.5 6 Connecticut, for example, is
one of several states which elect their judges and where candidates for office need not be attorneys.5 7 Lay judges may also
46
GA.
47

CONST. § 2-4 101.
CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §§ 45-I to -4 (1960), as amended, (Supp. 1969). Connecticut
may yet capture the distinction of being the leader. Because its probate districts are often
drawn along town lines (Id. § 45-1.), and since there are 169 towns, the possibility of
probate courts is not extinct.
further
48
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 701.1 (1968).
49 Other states also have numerous local courts in their probate systems: e.g., Missouri
(80 courts) (Mo. CONST. art. 5, § 16; Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 472.010(6), 472.020, 472.200,
472.250 (1956), as amended, (Supp. 1973)); New Mexico (30 courts) (N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 16-4-1, 16-4-10, 16-4-18 (1953), § 30-2-24 (Supp. 1971)).
50
CONN. CONST. art. V, § 4.
51 KAN. CONST. art. 3, § 8. The number of probate courts in Kansas has been fixed at
105.
52
ALA. CONST. art. VI, § 171.
53
TEX. CONST. art. V, 88 8, 16; TEx. PROB. CODE §§4-5 (1956), §§ 3(e)-(g) (1956), as
(Supp. 1972).
amended,
54
TENN. CODE ANN. § 1-205(7) (1955).
5
5 Id. § 27-401 to -408.
56
See Whitman, supra note 3 1, at 585.
57 CONN. CONST. art. 5, § 4. Since the voting age was lowered to 18 years, there is a
possibility-although perhaps not a probability-of a teenage probate judge in Connecticut. The only requirement for election to the office of probate judge is that one be an
elector. See CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 45-6 (1960); Conn. P.A. 127, § I, [1972] Public &
Special Acts 129.
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serve in West Virginia 58 and in one town of Rhode Island. 59 The
former also act as county commissioners (a three "judge" panel);
in the latter instance the members of the Town Council of New
Shoreham, Rhode Island also serve as judges of probate.
C. Benefits of Reform
Arguably the existing system of probate courts in the United
States-outside of those states which have granted jurisdiction in
probate matters to the general trial courts 6 0-is relatively harmless, even though inefficient. Nevertheless, the allocation of probate jurisdiction among several different courts, the use of diverse
appellate procedures, and the restraints on subject matter jurisdiction (as in accountings and construction of a will) act together to
confuse the beneficiary and attorney alike. Existing probate courts
are too often rule-encrusted, 61 not susceptible to recommended
court administrative procedures, 62 and productive of costly
make-work for lawyers and fiduciaries alike. 3 The result of these
factors is direct financial costs imposed upon those who are parties to a proceeding. Members of the general public, of course,
pay a tax on the transmission of wealth whenever any cost is
imposed directly or indirectly by the state incident to the passage
of property from one person to another. It matters little to the
ultimate beneficiary whether that cost is called a death duty or a
cost of administration. The situation now obtaining in our probate
courts should be of great concern to lawyers, trust officers, and
4
beneficiaries alike
Adoption of the court system suggested by the Uniform Probate Code would reap benefits for virtually all parties. A streamlined system would benefit both beneficiaries and fiduciaries (both
institutional and noninstitutional) by the cost savings it would
generate. It would also benefit attorneys by making their practices
simpler and probably economically more sound.
58 W. VA. CONST. art. 8, §§ 22-24; W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 7- 1-1 to 7-1-9 (1969), as
amended, (Supp. 1970).
59 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 8-9-2.2 to -2.3 (Supp. 1972).
60 See note 4 supra.
61 See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 12; N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. §§ 201, 209 (1967).
62 See, e.g., note 24 supra.
63 See, e.g., TEX. PROB. CODE § 5, Interpretive Comme ntary (1956).
64 An intensive use of the revocable lifetime trust appears to be developing as a means
of avoiding what is believed to be the undue delay, unnecessary interference, and unwarranted costs of probate proceedings. There is also some reason to believe that the
testamentary instrument is being reduced to an estate planning tool useful only in pouring
over assets into an existing lifetime trust. Concerned lawyers should be aware of the fact
that only the sophisticated client can in reality exercise this choice. See Wellman, The
Uniform Probate Code: A Possible Answer to Probate A voidance, 44 IND. L.J. 191, 205
(1969).
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11. COURT REFORM: THE AIMS OF THE
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE

Since much has been written about the Uniform Probate Code
only the most generalized comments are appropriate here.s 5 On
August 13, 1969, the Uniform Probate Code was promulgated by
resolution of the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association. The Code was the outgrowth of earlier attempts by the
American Bar Association to create a modern law of probate.
Although initial support for changes in the probate laws was
uneven,6 6 by 1969 public criticism of existing probate practices
was such that broad professional support for probate reform de7
veloped
The Uniform Probate Code is a relatively lengthy document
not susceptible to brief description; a detailed narrative consideration of the substance of the Code is beyond the scope of this
article. The broad changes in the judicial treatment of decedents'
estates offered by the Code involve an attempt by the draftsmen
to bring probate law into conformity with the apparent desires of
testators and beneficiaries when viewed in light of present-day tax
and economic considerations. The attempt has been made by
reshaping the role of the courts vis-h-vis probate matters. Hence
many of the Code's changes are largely procedural. The basic
concept of the Code regarding the role of the court is that resort
to a court should be had only where there is need for court
supervision or where there is a contest requiring adjudication.
Court supervision is not, however, denied to anyone who wishes
to secure review of a fiduciary's activities.
Professor Richard V. Wellman6 8 has stated the role of the
courts vis-h-vis the Code to be as follows:
The major change we propose is not novel or dramatic. We
simply propose that the relationship of probate court to estates be made more like the normal relationship that courts
bear toward persons in respect of civil matters. Thus, we
have designed a system in which the judge occupies a passive, supportive relationship to every estate. We have sought
to give every interested person easy access to a judge capable
of fully handling any kind of question relating to an estate.
But, we have sought to have the ultimate question of whether
and when a judge will be involved determined by the interested persons, rather than by a system which denies survi6See generally Wellman, supra note 6; Wellman, supra note 14.
6 See Wellman, supra note 6, at 636.
6
7 See Wellman, supra note 14, at 453-54.
68 Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.
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vors their assets until they pay their homage to the probate
court. We have sought also to keep the scope of judicial
matters to the dimensions dictated by questions raised in the
pleading. Hence, unless someone with interest in an estate
wants a judicial order for the resolution of a question, or the
elimination of a risk, no judicial order will be required by the
69
State Code.
As previously noted, 70 the Code does not mandate any particular type of court. Section 1-201(5) of the Code defines court to
mean "the Court or branch having jurisdiction in matters relating
to the affairs of decedents." 71 The states, therefore, will be free to
72
retain the various names used commonly such as probate court,
court of ordinary, 73 chancery court, 74 orphans' court, 75 or county
court. 76 Because it defines the extensive scope of jurisdiction
vested in the designated court, Section 1-302 reflects the aims of
the Code in this regard. It provides:
(a) To the full extent permitted by the constitution, the Court
has jurisdiction over all subject matter relating to (I) estates
of decedents, including construction of wills and determination of heirs and successors of decedents, and estates of
protected persons; (2) protection of minors and incapacitated
persons; and (3) trusts.
(b) The Court has full power to make orders, judgments and
decrees and take all other action necessary and proper to
administer justice in the matters which come before it.
Enactment of Section 1-302 would result in an immediate change
in any state whose probate courts do not exercise jurisdiction of
this scope. Moreover, Section 1-308 would appear to preclude the
continued existence of probate appeals in the form of trials de
novo in courts of general jurisdiction, 77 for appeals from the
designated court are to be treated as is an appeal from an equity

case in the general trial court.
The Code simplifies venue problems to the point where they
are virtually nonexistent. 7 8 It also adopts the rules of procedure of
9
6 See Address by Professor Richard V. Wellman, in UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, Prefatory Note (Working Draft No. 5, 1969). See also Wellman, The Lawyer's Stake in

Probate Reforms, 47 MICH. ST. B.J., Mar., 1968, at 14- 17.
70 See

note 6 and accompanying text supra.

71 UPC § 1-201(5).
72
E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REV.
73

§§ 45-1,45-4 (1958).
E.g., GA. CONST. § 2-4101.
7 E.g., ARK. CONST. amend. 24; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 62-2004 (Supp. 1971).
75 E.g.,MD. ANN. CODE art. 93, § 2-101 (1969).
76Other names in addition to county court occasionally appear (for example, circuit
court) although territorial jurisdiction is usually limited to a particular county. Indiana is an
example of this. See note 24, supra.
77See UPC § 1-308.
78
Id. § 1-303.
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the general trial court of the state to the fullest extent possible 79
and vests the court with full judicial power, including that needed
to grant equitable remedies and to conduct jury trials.8 0
Undoubtedly, the major change advocated in the Code concerns the use of the court's personnel. In order to reduce judicial
involvement in affairs which do not involve actual disputes as to
decedents' estates, the Code provides that nonadjudicative functions may be performed by a registrar. The court to which the
legislature grants probate jurisdiction may appoint a judge or an
official of that court, including a clerk, as registrar.8 1 By allocating
to the registrar certain functions which, because they do not relate
to judicial determination of the disputed issue, may be exercised
administratively, the draftsmen of the Code sought to bring about
efficient, inexpensive, and uncomplicated procedures for the settlement of estates.8 2 This allocation also subserves the Code's
goal of removing the administration of estates from the active
83
supervision of the courts.
The Code envisions two styles of probate proceedings: informal, in which the registrar administers the presentation and
certification of wills and appointment of personal representatives; 4 and formal, in which matters regarding probate of wills,
appointment of representatives, and settlement of estates are litigated in the designated court.8 Formal proceedings also include
litigation to obtain orders in matters within the full jurisdiction of
the court, including matters not traditionally deemed decedents'
estates, if the court's jurisdiction is that broad.8 6 In order to
obtain informal probate or appointment, the personal representative applies to the registrar.8 7 Since proceedings for the probate of
wills may be combined with proceedings for the appointment of
personal representatives,8 the registrar, if he is satisfied with the
sufficiency of the information submitted to him,8 9 can expedite the
§ 1-304.
§§ 1-302(b), 1-306.
Id. §§ 1-201(3), 1-307.
8
2 Wellman, supra note 64, at 198-200.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81

83 UPC art. 3, General Comment reads in part:
Overall, the system accepts the premise that the Court's role in regard to
probate and administration, and its relationship to personal representatives .... is wholly passive until some interested person invokes its power to
secure resolution of a matter. The state, through the Court, should provide
remedies which are suitable and efficient to protect any and all rights regarding succession, but should refrain from intruding into family affairs unless
relief is requested, and limit its relief to that sought.
H83-301 to 3-311.
85Id. 88 3-401 to 3-618.
84Id.

96 Id.

§ 3-105.

87 Id. § 3-301.

8s Id. § 3-107.
RId. 88 3-301, 3-308.
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settlement of the estate by entering an informal order.9 0 The
powers of the registrar also include functions which are more
clerical in nature. For example, a person qualifying as personal
representative must, if required, execute and file a bond with the
registrar,9 1 and an interested party or creditor who seeks to have
the representative provide a bond must file his demand with the
registrar? 2 The registrar, in his capacity as court official, may also
perform the wholly clerical tasks of filing notices and receiving
papers, among others. The responsibilities of the registrar, although characterized as nonjudicial, are not only broad, but essential as well to the functioning of the probate court system.
Finally, the enactment of the Code will not summarily terminate the services of a judge not qualified for appointment under
the Code,9 3 although all newly appointed probate judges must
have the same qualifications as a judge of the state court ex94
ercising general jurisdiction.
III.
A

APPROACHES TO COURT STRUCTURE:
CONSIDERATION OF ALTERNATIVES

Given the varied structures of present probate court systems,
the most immediate question is how states enacting the Code
should restructure their courts. Although the changes introduced
by the Code arguably could be accommodated within the existing
court systems of most states, the allocation by the Code of subject
matter jurisdiction, with enhanced judicial power, to a single court
necessitates structural change in those states that have not yet
consolidated their courts. The enactment of the Code would seem
to require that the state legislature select one tribunal and grant it
exclusive original jurisdiction over probate matters? 5 Additionally
Section 3-105 of the Code vests this tribunal with concurrent
jurisdiction to hear matters involving succession or to which the
estate is a party. Thus, the court selected by the legislature is
likely to be either (1) the existing system of probate courts, or (2)
the present general trial court. Where there is no constitutional
impediment to doing so, a third alternative would be for the
legislature to empower the state supreme court to assign probate
jurisdiction to the inferior courts, without otherwise disturbing the
existing court structure. In fact, under this alternative the delegation of administrative or nonjudicial functions to probate judges
may offer a solution to the vexing problem of the future of in90 Id. § 3-302, 3-307(a), 3-1003.
91 Id. § 3-604.
92 Id. § 3-605.
93
id. § 8-101.
9Id. § 1-309.
95
Id. §§ 1-201(5), 1-302.
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cumbent judges whose qualifications may be less than the Code's
requirements? 6 An existing, constitutionally entrenched body of
probate judges, politically resistant to serious change might otherwise pose a serious obstacle to adoption of the UPC.
On the other hand the Code is so drafted as to be adaptable to
those states whose legislatures are constitutionally unable to reshape their courts. This feature of the Code was, of course, quite
intentional. The draftsmen stated:
If any particular state finds constitutional amendment is necessary to increase the power of the judicial side of the probate
court, it might side step the difficulty by assigning the judicial
functions described to a division of the general trial bench,
and the non-judicial functions to existing inferior probate
officers. The important point, however, is that the judicial
assignments contemplated by the draft call for a fully
equipped court with appeals therefrom being handled like
97
appeals from other equity causes.
In those states where constitutional impediments make legislative
action alone insufficient to dismantle the probate courts, the legislature might nonetheless be able to assign the nonadjudicative
functions of the registrar to existing, inferior probate court judges
without significant structural change. 98 It should also be noted
that in some states nonadjudicative officials, such as the registrar,
might exercise these functions. If this step were taken, the Connecticut experience indicates that it would be prudent to appoint a
judge of the general trial court as probate court administrator,
with power to insure full coordination of effort among officials at
all levels of the probate court structure. 99 The primary duty of the
probate court administrator would be to make uniform the disposition of probate matters among the several courts of the state.
In light of the existing probate court structures of the several
states, it would seem reasonable to predict that one of the following plans of court reorganization will be adopted as a necessary
adjunct to the enactment of the Uniform Probate Code:
I. Retain the existing state probate court structure and divest all
other courts of their present original or concurrent jurisdiction over
probate matters.
2. Create a wholly new probate court having exclusive original
jurisdiction of all matters cognizable under the Code. The new
probate court would have a trial bench composed of judges pos96

See Dupont. supra note 5. at 571. See also notes 81-82 and accompanying text

supra.

" Address by Professor Richard V. Wellman, supra note 69. See also UPC § 3-105,
Reporters' Notes (Working Draft No. 5, 1969).
" See note 81 and accompanying text supra.
99 See generally Whitman. supra note I.

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 6:375

sessing the same qualifications as the judges of the general trial
court. Appeals would be taken to the supreme court, as in other
equity cases.
3. Enlarge the exclusive original jurisdiction of the general trial
court (or appropriate inferior trial court), and either (a) abolish the
office of probate judge by constitutional amendment or legislative
action, or (b) retain probate court judges currently in office and
delegate to them the nonadjudicative administrative functions contemplated by the Code.

A. Enlarging the Powers and Jurisdiction
of Present Probate Courts
Any plan calling for expansion of the jurisdiction of the present
probate courts would seem to be a realistic alternative only in
those states whose courts presently exercise extensive probate
jurisdiction independent of the general trial courts. 10 0 Because of
the complexity of issues often arising in litigated probate disputes
no one would seriously argue that a lay probate judge or part-time
jurist should preside over a jury trial.' 0 1 Moreover, in those states
which use the trial de novo as an appeal, the determination of
contested matters in the general trial courts has already proved
satisfactory, except as to the cost and delay attendant upon the
first trial in the inferior probate court. Thus, it would seem unwise
to enact legislation designed to terminate the services of skilled
judges of the general trial courts, while simultaneously broadening
the jurisdiction of largely untrained, part-time judges of inferior
courts of probate which exist in vast numbers in states such as
Connecticut, Georgia, and South Carolina. 0 2 This proliferation
of judges ensconced by legislative action and occasionally by
fundamental law in their tiny probate fiefdoms cannot be squared
with the aims of sound judicial administration.' 0 3 To augment
their power would almost certainly not result in significant probate reform.
Moreover, even if such power were to be granted, the qualifications of these probate judges would have to be upgraded far
beyond merely being an elector in a particuar probate dis100 These states include Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, and Wisconsin. See notes
21-23 and accompanying text supra.
101Whitman, supra note 31, at 595-98.
102 For these and other states with seemingly

large numbers of judges see text accom-

panying notes 45- 52 supra.
02
'
See Whitman, supra note 31, at 585 n.15, 586 n.16, 587 n.18, 588-90, 592-602,

606-07, 611- 14. See also Comment, supra note 6. More studies of this type are needed in
order to provide political leaders with a factual basis to support their decisions. It is
suggested that this type of project should be inaugurated in every state.
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trict' 0 4 Notwithstanding the fact that the UPC would permit
current judges of probate who lack the qualifications for office
imposed by the Code to continue in office, 10 5 this provision cannot be used to justify the grant of plenary judicial powers, now
held only by the general trial courts of the state, to lay judges and
part-time probate officials. Indeed, this pattern of court consolidation would require the legislatures of some states to reverse
their prior determinations denying jurisdiction over guardianships,
conservatorships, adoptions, and affairs of minors and protected
persons to existing inferior probate courts.10 6 This reduction of
the jurisdiction of the general trial courts might be too costly in
terms of loss of judicial expertise to be acceptable.
B. A Surrogate Court
The second alternative is to create a wholly new probate court
system having exclusive original jurisdiction of all matters enumerated by the Code. In those states (such as Massachusetts)
whose probate courts are exercising independent and extensive
jurisdiction over decedents' estates, the existing courts could continue with some modifications in the range of cognizable subject
matter.10 7 In those states which have delegated probate jurisdiction to the chancery courts the Code would require the creation of
probate courts and the divestiture by chancery courts of all probate jurisdiction.' 0 8 This new system of courts, however independent, would nevertheless be vested by Section 3-105 of the
Code with some jurisdiction concurrent with the general trial
courts. This plan would allow for the retention of existing probate
officials in those states having numerous (and sometimes
1 04

See Whitman, supra note 31, at 595-97. In Alabama, any attempt to impose a
requirement that all judges exercising probate jurisdiction be lawyers would violate the
state constitution. See ALA. CONST. art. VI, § 154.
t UPC § 8-101(b)(6).
106 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. § 25.110 (1971).

107 In Massachusetts this would appear to involve only elimination of the concurrent
jurisdiction of the superior court in matters committed to the probate court under the
Code. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 215, §§ 3, 6 (1955), as amended, (Supp. 1971).

Maryland would need to expand the jurisdiction of its orphans' courts to include jurisdiction over trusts as well as estates. Additionally, equity jurisdiction appears to be limited, so

that full equitable relief may not be obtainable in all cases. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 93,
§ 2-102 (1969). Jurisdition over inter vivos trusts would have to be conferred on New
York's surrogate's courts. See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 121 N.Y. SUR. CT. PRO. § 209)

4

)

(1967). Concurrent jurisdiction over inter vivos trusts could not be retained by Wisconsin's circuit courts. See Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 253.10, 851.25, 879.27 (197 1).

108 In Arkansas, for example, the consolidation of the probate courts and the chancery
courts is incomplete at this time. See ARK. CONST. amend. 24. In New Jersey, three courts

may become involved in matters required to be confined to a single court under the UPC,
although to some extent the function of the surrogate is akin to that of the registrar
contemplated by the Code. See note 22 supra.
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part-time) elected probate judges.10 9 These officials could administer informal probate proceedings as registrars or could be variously designated as surrogates, registrars of probate, or simply as
clerks. Additionally, there is nothing in the Code to prevent the
election of these officials in any state which has a constitutional
requirement to that effect. 1 0° The retention of some official responsibilities for existing inferior court judges could be accomplished under this alternative as well as under the suggested plan
for enlarging the jurisdiction of the general trial court discussed
below. In effect the expertise of these officials could be transferred from the former courts and be wholly incorporated into the
newly created courts.
In creating a wholly new probate court system, a legislature
might well be moved to consolidate a number of probate jurisdictions by way of designating seats of court!" If the legislature is
unable to make this difficult political decision, then the supreme
court or the probate court administrator might determine the
location of the probate courts. In either event, a more efficient and
rational allocation of judicial resources than presently exists could
result.
Yet any plan to "spin off" probate jurisdiction will increase
specialization of the judiciary to an unwarranted degree and further isolate the functions and facilities of the probate court from
the general trial courts. Moreover, it would seem that any plan of
court reorganization which emphasizes the distinction between
courts of law and equity is a backward step today, even if the
existing general trial courts are already heavily burdened, or are
themselves no model of adequate court facilities or procedures.
The desirability of reversing the present trend toward court consolidation, for whatever purpose, is at least open to question.
There are also other costs attendant upon the creation of a wholly
new and independent probate court system. Skilled jurists may be
difficult to obtain since a high degree of specialization will be
required with concomitant repetitiveness of assignments. Furthermore, the flow of work may be sporadic and difficult to regulate,
with a collateral effect on judicial efficiency. Finally, a considerable expenditure of funds for new court facilities may make
such a plan too costly to consider.
109 See

notes 45-52 and accompanying text supra.

0

"1 See note 28 and accompanying text supra.

"' States such as Connecticut could reduce the number of districts electing probate
officials. Alabama, however, has a constitutional provision forbidding consolidation. See
note 28 supra. The Michigan legislature currently has the power to combine counties into
probate districts, subject to the approval of the electorate of the affected counties. MICH.
CONST. art. 6, § 15. See also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 701.2a (Supp. 1972).
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C. Court Consolidation in the
General Trial Court
If the jurisdiction of the general trial court were expanded, and
minor court judges were retained as nonjudicial officials serving in
their present probate districts, then a considerable reallocation of
subject matter jurisdiction would have occurred, even though the
extent of apparent structural reform would be modest. The resulting court structure would be in accord with the minimal requirements of the Code. 112 Two basic problems might arise as a consequence of consolidating the probate and general trial courts.
First, the trial courts might initially be faced with some matters
with which they are unfamiliar. This problem would, however, be
imitigated by extant guideposts for the trial judge such as case law
and treatises in the probate field. In this sense the trial courts
would be in a somewhat more favorable position than when they
must confront a matter brought under a newly enacted statute,
where there are fewer indicators of appropriate considerations.
Second, there is the issue of what becomes of present probate
officials. Retention of judges as registrars of the court would
accomplish the requisite change while avoiding a seemingly harsh
treatment of those persons, most of whom have served their
constituencies as well as the existing system permits." 3 For both
practical and idealistic reasons, probate reform probably should
not incur the emnity of such men and women, and using their
skills in this manner would avoid this difficulty.
A legislature could also confer upon the state supreme court
the duty of assigning probate functions, whether judicial or nonjudicial, to inferior courts, including the probate court. The jurisdiction of probate courts would thereby be narrowly confined to
administrative matters requiring little or no adjudication. If the
supreme court were permitted to define the probate districts as
1-201(5), 1-308.
Traditionally not all disputes relating to the estate of a decedent could be litigated in a
court of probate. In a probate proceeding, the question before the court is whether the
testamentary instrument is the legal and valid will of the decedent unrevoked at the time of
his death. For example, where plaintiffs sought to prevent probate of a will on the ground
that decedent's spouse had fraudulently prevented the revocation of the will, the California
Supreme Court ruled that relief was unavailable in a probate proceeding and had to be
obtained in a court of equity. Estate of Silva, 169 Cal. 116, 121-22, 145 P. 1015, 1017
(1915). The order of the probate court admitting the will did not preclude plaintiff from
seeking constructive trust relief in equity. Brazil v. Silva, 181 Cal. 490, 493, 185 P. 174,
175 (1919). Thus, it is not sufficient for probate courts merely to be located within the
general trial court. In order to be able to settle an estate in its entirety, the court designated
to probate wills and appoint representatives should have jurisdiction concurrent with the
general trial court to hear all matters involving the estate or its representative. See UPC
§ 3-105 and Comment.
113 See Whitman, supra note 3 1, at 599.
112 UPC §§
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well, then the numbers of judges and seats of court could be
selectively brought into line with judicial needs. In addition a
probate court administrator could play a significant role in this
regard.
In many jurisdictions, the general trial courts currently have
little or no involvement with probate matters. Thus, consolidating
probate jurisdiction in the trial court may deprive probate matters
of the specialized attention of a probate judge. Selecting the
general trial court as the Code-mandated court might, however,
have a positive aspect in that the court would not be compelled to
change its current role toward fiduciaries, who will have greater
freedom from court supervision under the Code.1 14 Presumably
these courts now hear probate matters only when an interested
party brings suit.
It would seem that those jurisdictions which have either dratically reduced the numbers of probate judges or wholly eliminated
probate courts, while consolidating probate jurisdiction, have
demonstrated that this last discussed plan is the most efficient and
least costly solution to reconciling the existing state court structures and the Uniform Probate Code. The selection of the general
trial court follows logically from the Code's policy of locating
extensive jurisdiction over matters involving decedents' estates in
a fully competent court.
IV. CONCLUSION
Retention of existing probate courts and an enlargement of
their powers and jurisdiction would appear not to be a sound
choice for those states considering structural changes. The creation of a new probate court modeled on the Massachusetts or
New York systems would create problems for court administrators because it would result in dispersion of court personnel
and facilities. Enlarging the subject matter jurisdiction of the
existing general trial court would seem to be the only sound
approach. The fact that many states have already moved in this
114 See notes 81-83 and accompanying text supra.

The draftsmen of the Model Probate Code, which preceded the Uniform Probate Code,
advocated that the probate court "should be the same court as the court of general
jurisdiction or should be a division of it." L. SIMES & P. BASYE, supra note 14, at 483. As
part of this structure, they argued that:
It would seem that, if, as is herein advocated, a noncontentious, summary
procedure is permitted, efficiency would require that some judicial powers be
given to the clerk or register [sic] in these matters. However, the judge
should be held to strict accountability for these acts.
Id. at 487. In arriving at this conclusion, Simes and Bayse surveyed the then-existing roles
of nonjudicial court officials. Id. at 477-82. See also Model Probate Code § 11 (1946).
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direction, 1 15 and that Idaho, the first state to adopt the Uniform
Probate Code, 11 6 has done likewise, suggests that the conclusion
urged is an acceptable one. With this approach existing probate
judges could be continued in office, with a gradual reduction in the
number of probate districts and increase in the qualification of
court personnel.
To smooth the path for this transition, a detailed analysis of the
workloads of the existing inferior probate courts and courts of
general jurisdiction should be undertaken at once by interested
attorneys, organizations, and bar associations. 11 7 Failure to make
such studies will militate against the enactment of the Uniform
Probate Code except in those jurisdictions wherein probate matters are presently handled by the general trial court.
Consideration of structural reforms need not impede enlightened discussion of the Code itself because the Code draftsmen
have not sought to impose upon the states a plan of court reorganization. Rather they have created a body of procedural law
which can be used in a variety of structural settings. As this
article has attempted to illustrate, consolidation of the courts
would seem to be the path most consistent with the goals the
Code seeks to achieve.

See note 4 supra.
The Code became effective in Idaho on July I, 1972. Ch. I 11,§ 28, [19711 Idaho
Sess. Laws 382.
117The efforts already made in this direction by the Alabama Law Review and Connecticut Law Review have provided much valuable data and charted a course for others to
follow. See Symposium on Probate Law, 2 CONN. L. REV. 449 (1970).
115

116

